In a 5-4 landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court followed its ground-breaking ruling in  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. _____, and,  in reversing the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation of a District Court’s holding denying Petitioner’s 2^nd Amendment arguments against municipal  firearms bans,  held that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right and  incorporated against the states under the 14^th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The case has been remanded.     

While the majority of the Court deciding in favor of McDonald held that the 2^nd Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process clause of the 14^th Amendment, Justice Thomas took one of the roads argued by Petitioners’ counsel, which made some believe that the Court overruled the Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank  decisions, and that the  “privileges and immunities” clause of the Constitution was the basis for Second Amendment  incorporation.  Nevertheless, Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, together with that of Justice Scalia’s, added to the majority five votes needed to decide favorably for the Petitioners.  Attorney Alan Gura, who was counsel in the Heller case,  successfully represented McDonald, and other individual petitioners as well as the Illinois State Rifle Association and the Second Amendment Foundation.  Attorney Gura has certainly made his mark in history.     

“Section 24–1.6(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a person is not guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon if that weapon is “unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(c)(iii) (West 2006). In the case at bar, we are asked to determine whether the center console of a vehicle is a “case” within the meaning of this provision. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it is.”

The Court noted that the “Defendant testified that, when he was pulled over, he was about to drive back to Florida, and that he carried his guns in the console when traveling because the highway was “dangerous.” Defendant’s passenger, Willie Moore, also testified. He confirmed that defendant asked him for the keys to the console, that he retrieved them from the glove compartment and gave them to defendant, and that defendant then unlocked the console. After defendant unlocked the console, Moore said, defendant advised Boland he had guns in the console.

The defense sought a jury Instruction at the close of the evidence based on section 24–1.6(c)(iii) “ that a person is not guilty of aggravated unlawful use of weapons if the weapons are enclosed in a “case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container” by a person who has been issued a currently valid FOID card. The trial judge refused the instruction.

The trial judge also prohibited defendant from asserting, in closing argument, that the console was a ‘case’ or “other container” under section 24–1.6(c)(iii). However, the State was allowed to argue that the console was not a ‘case.”’

. . . [T]he jury returned its verdict, finding defendant guilty of aggravated unlawful use of weapons. The court sentenced defendant to 30 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the center console of a vehicle is a “case” within the meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii). 379 Ill. App. 3d 994. In so holding, the appellate court rejected the finding in People v. Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d 548 (2003), that a glove compartment was not a “case” or the legislature did not define the word “case” as used in section 24–1.6(c)(iii) and this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of that term. We review this question of law de novo. Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 226 Ill. 2d 36, 51 (2007).”

. . .Because the term “case,” used in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), is not defined, we assume the legislature intended the term to have its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 325 (2005). The plain and ordinary definition of “case” is: “a box or receptacle to contain or hold something (as for carrying, shipping, or safekeeping).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 346 (1993). Examples given in the dictionary included “a silver cigarette [case],” “12 bottles in a [case],” and “a display [case] in a meat market.” A “box” is defined as: “a rigid typically rectangular receptacle often with a lid or cover in which something non liquid is kept or carried” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 263 (1993)) and a “receptacle” is defined as something that “receives and contains something” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1894 (1993)).

In Cameron, the appellate court interpreted the phrase “other container” within section 24–1.6(c)(iii). The Cameron court found that not only were a “firearm carrying box” and “shipping box” portable receptacles, but a “case” was as well. Invoking the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the court concluded, based on the common element of portability among the items in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), that an “other container” must also be portable. Because a glove compartment is fixed, and not portable, the Cameron court held that it was not an “other container” within the meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii).

We, like the appellate court, find the Cameron court’s analysis flawed. The Cameron court never attempted to define “case”; it merely assumed a “case” must be portable. While a firearm carrying box and shipping box might contain an inherent element of portability, under its plain and ordinary definition, “case” does not. For example, a display case in a meat market or elsewhere is not portable in the commonly understood meaning of portability.1 Accordingly, not all “cases” are portable. Because there is no common attribute of portability amongst the terms utilized in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), the Cameron court’s analysis is incorrect.”

. . .The State’s argument that noscitur a sociis resolves the case at bar fails for the same reason that ejusdem generis fails. There is nothing in the language of the statute from which one could conclude that the legislature intended the terms “shipping box” and “other container” to be interpreted only in reference to firearms. Thus, there is nothing in the overall statutory scheme to suggest that the legislature intended for the various types of receptacles to be firearm specific.

Moreover, the term “firearm” does not precede all of the terms or phrases, i.e., the statute does not read “firearm case, carrying box, shipping box or other container.” Likewise, the statute does not read “case, carrying box, shipping box, or other firearm container.” Had section 24–1.6(c)(iii) been drafted in either of these ways, it might be reasonable to interpret it to require that all specified types of receptacles be interpreted only in reference to firearms. Based on the actual language of the statute, we conclude that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis simply does not apply here.”

. . . However, we need not resort to the legislature history because we find the plain language of section 24–1.6(c)(iii) unambiguous. Un-persuaded by the State’s arguments, we conclude that the legislature used the broad general term “case” unmodified. Giving the word “case” its plain and ordinary meaning, as we must, permits but one conclusion: the term “case” in section 24–1.6(c)(iii) includes any portable or non portable receptacle and need not be interpreted only in reference to firearms.

Based on the foregoing, we find, in the case at bar, that the center console of a vehicle falls within the ordinary definition of case. A center console is a receptacle that contains or holds something. As such, we find that defendant’s conduct falls within the exception set forth in section 24–1.6(c)(iii). In so finding, we note that our result is controlled by the plain language of section 24–16(c)(iii) as enacted by the legislature. We are not at liberty to depart from the language employed. Whether the statute is wise or the best means to achieve the desired result are matters left to the legislature, not this court.

Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s proposed jury instruction based on section 24–1.6(c)(iii) and erred in refusing to permit defendant to argue in closing argument that the center console was a “case” within the meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii). Our determination that the center console is a “case” within the meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii) does not end this case. A factual question remains as to whether the exception is applicable based on whether the firearms at issue here were “enclosed” in the center console. For this reason, we remand the matter to the circuit court for a new trial. In light of our decision, we must consider whether a new trial would subject defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 134 (1997); People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 201 (1988). “

. . .We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Affirmed.”